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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
David Ray McDonald appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of
methamphetamine, entered upon his conditional guilty plea. On appeal, he argues that
the district court erred by denying his suppression motion.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In 2009, McDonald was convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia and was
placed on misdemeanor probation for two years.

(State's Ex. 1.)

Pursuant to his

probation agreement, McDonald agreed to "abstain from the illegal use, possession,
control, delivery, production, manufacture or distribution of any controlled substance"
and to submit to drug tests and not tamper with them. (State's Ex. 2.) He also agreed
to permit probation officers "to search [his] person, vehicle, residence, or any other
property under [his] control without a warrant at any time, day or night upon reasonable
suspicion to ensure compliance" with the terms of his probation. (Id.)
As found by the district court, on January 26 and February 1, 2011, McDonald
tested positive for the use of methamphetamine. (R., p.55.) In March, Probation Officer
Gomez instructed McDonald to enroll in the cognitive self-change program.
McDonald did not.

(Id.)

(Id.)

On April 13, Officer Gomez again told McDonald that he

needed to attend the treatment program.

(Id.)

McDonald represented that he had

contacted the treatment facility. (Id.) Officer Gomez told him that she knew he was not
enrolled in the treatment program and that she had received a discharge letter from that
program. (Id.) She instructed McDonald to enroll with Bell Counseling's cognitive selfchange program. (Id.) On April 15, she learned that McDonald had not enrolled with
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that program. (R., p.56.) Then, on April 18, she learned that McDonald had attempted
to falsify a drug test using a "device." (Id.)
On April 28, accompanied by Caldwell Police Officer Ibarra, Officer Gomez went
to search McDonald's residence.

(Id.)

They were let into the home by McDonald's

mother, who lived with McDonald, and directed back to McDonald's bedroom. (Id.) The
bedroom door was locked, but McDonald's mother unlocked it with an "instrument" and
opened it for the officers.

(Id.)

The officers entered the room where they found a

"Whizzinator" (a device designed to falsify urine samples) with what appeared to be a
pouch of urine lying on McDonald's bed.

(R., p.57.)

The officers also found

methamphetamine and marijuana. (9/13/2011 Tr., p.35, L.19 - p.36, L.13.)
The state charged McDonald with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.1718.)

McDonald moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the course of Officer

Gomez's search of his bedroom. (R., pp.24-25, 29-30, 38-41.) The district court held
an evidentiary hearing on McDonald's motion. (9/13/2011 Tr.) After the hearing, the
district court denied McDonald's suppression motion, concluding that the search was
consistent with the terms of McDonald's misdemeanor probation because Officer
Gomez had reasonable suspicion to believe a search of McDonald's room would
produce evidence of a probation violation. (R., pp.48-59.)
McDonald entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal from the
district court's denial of his suppression motion. (10/17/2011 Tr., p.2, L.20 - p.4, L.9.)
The district court entered judgment against McDonald, imposed a suspended sentence
of five years with two years fixed, and placed him on probation for a period of four
years. (R., pp.71-74.) McDonald filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.75-78.)
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ISSUE
McDonald states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. McDonald's motion to
suppress?
(Appellant's brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has McDonald failed to show error in the denial of his suppression motion?
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ARGUMENT
McDonald Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
On April 28, during her regularly-scheduled ride-along, Probation Officer Gomez,

accompanied by Caldwell Police Officer Ibarra, searched McDonald's bedroom without
a warrant and found a "Whizzinator" with a pouch of urine, methamphetamine, and
marijuana. (9/13/2011 Tr., p.21, L.18 - p.22, L.11; p.35, L.19 - p.36, L.13.) McDonald
moved to suppress the evidence found during the warrantless search. (R., pp.24-25,
29-30, 38-41.) The district court, concluding that the search was based on reasonable
suspicion that McDonald was violating the terms of his probation, and was therefore
consistent with his agreement of supervision, denied the suppression motion.

(R.,

pp.48-59.) On appeal, McDonald argues that the district court erred in its determination
that Officer Gomez had reasonable suspicion to conduct the search. (Appellant's brief,
pp.8-12). Application of the correct legal standards to the facts found by the district
court, however, shows no error.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court accepts the

trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and exercises
free review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards have
been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-86,
211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286
(Ct. App. 1996).

At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of

witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is
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vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997
(1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659,662 (Ct. App. 1999).

C.

Officer Gomez Had Reasonable Suspicion That McDonald Was No Longer
Complying With The Terms Of His Probation, Permitting Her To Conduct The
Warrantless Search
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Warrantless searches are generally considered unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, "subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
One exception to the warrant requirement is a search done pursuant to consent.
Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citations omitted); State v.
Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003). Freely and voluntarily given
consent validates a search.

Bustamente, 412 U.S. at 222 (citations omitted).

A

misdemeanant probationer may validly waive his Fourth Amendment rights as a
condition of probation. State v. Josephson, 125 Idaho 119, 123, 867 P.2d 993, 997 (Ct.
App. 1993). When a probationer, as an express term of his probation, has waived his
right to be free from a warrantless search, such warrantless searches are valid. State v.
Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 209, 207 P.3d 182, 185 (2009) (citing State v. Gawron, 112
Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987)).

"Additionally, when the basis for a

search is consent, the government must conform to the limitations placed upon the right
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granted to search." State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 154, 106 P.3d 477, 480 (Ct. App.
2004) (citations omitted).
In this case, as an express condition of his probation, McDonald consented to
"permit officers of Canyon County Probation Department to search my
person, vehicle, residence, or any other property under my control without
a warrant at any time, day or night upon reasonable suspicion to ensure
compliance with the Agreement of Supervision."
(State's Ex. 2.) Thus, McDonald agreed to allow Officer Gomez to search his residence
at any time, as long as she had reasonable suspicion that he was not in compliance
with the terms and conditions of his probation.
Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific articulable facts and the
rational inferences that naturally follow from those facts. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
(1968); State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896-97, 821 P.2d 949, 951-52 (1991). While
the quantity and quality of information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is
less than that necessary to establish probable cause, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,
330 (1990), reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or "inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion," United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).

The

reasonableness of an officer's suspicion is evaluated based upon the totality of the
circumstances.

United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); State v.

Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520,522 (1992).
Among the terms and conditions of his probation, McDonald agreed to "be
cooperative and truthful in my compliance with the probation department." (State's Ex.
2.) He also agreed to
abstain from the illegal use, possession, control, delivery, production,
manufacture or distribution of any controlled substance including illegal
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drugs and/or prescription drugs unless lawfully prescribed by a physician.
I will submit to ANY tests for the use of alcohol and/or controlled
substances when requested, at my own expense. These tests will not be
tampered, diluted or altered in any way.
(Id.) Because Officer Gomez had reasonable suspicion that McDonald was violating
these terms of his probation, her warrantless search was proper.
McDonald tested positive for methamphetamine use in both January and
February, 2011. (R., p.55.) Officer Gomez instructed McDonald to enroll in cognitive
self-change in March, but he did not.

(Id.)

On April 13, Officer Gomez met with

McDonald to follow-up on his enrollment in the course. (Id.) McDonald lied to Officer
Gomez, telling her that he had contacted the treatment facility. (Id.) Officer Gomez,
catching McDonald in his lie, told him that she was in contact with the course instructor
and that she had in fact received a discharge letter from the program.

(Id.)

Officer

Gomez then instructed McDonald to enroll with Bell Counseling's cognitive self-change
programming. (Id.) Two days later, on April 15, Officer Gomez followed-up with Bell
Counseling and learned that McDonald had not enrolled with the treatment program.
(R., pp.55-56.) Officer Gomez then learned that, on April 18, McDonald attempted to
use a device to falsify a urine sample. (R., p.56.)
Under the totality of these circumstances, Officer Gomez had reasonable
suspicion that McDonald was violating the terms of his probation: he was using drugs
again, he was tampering with his drug tests, and he was being neither cooperative nor
truthful with his probation officer. This reasonable suspicion allowed Officer Gomez to
properly search McDonald's room, consistent with his consent.
therefore, properly denied McDonald's suppression motion.
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The district court,

Even setting aside the consent provision of McDonald's probation agreement, the
search of his bedroom was still proper because it was supported by reasonable
suspicion. Parolees and probationers enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy against
governmental intrusion. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). A probationer may be subject to warrantless searches by
a probation officer if that probation officer has reasonable suspicion that the probationer
has violated probation. Knights, 534 U.S. at 121-22; see also State v. Anderson, 140
Idaho 484, 487-88, 95 P.3d 635, 638-39 (2004) (defendant released on own
recognizance after conviction but before sentencing is subject to search upon
reasonable suspicion); State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 748, 250 P.3d 796, 799 (Ct. App.
2011) ("probation searches may be conducted without consent when the officers are
there to investigate reasonable suspicion of violation of probation terms"); State v.
Adams, 146 Idaho 162, 164, 191 P .3d 240, 242 (Ct. App. 2008) (probation searches
based on suspicion are reasonable "[e]ven in the absence of a warrantless search
condition").

Because Officer Gomez had reasonable suspicion that McDonald was

violating the terms of his probation, she could properly search his bedroom, even
without his Fourth Amendment waiver.
On appeal, McDonald argues that the information relied upon by Officer Gomez
to search his bedroom was stale because it was ten days old. (Appellant's brief, pp.1112.)

The district court, however, concluded that the ten-day period "was not an

unreasonable amount of time" under the circumstances of this case. (R., p.58.) The
district court's conclusion is supported by the applicable legal standards.
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"[T]here exists no magical number of days within which information is fresh and
after which the information becomes stale. The question must be resolved in light of the
circumstances of each case." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 471, 477, 4 P.3d 1122, 1128
(Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. Gomez, 101 Idaho 802,808,623 P.2d 110, 116 (1980)).
Where the suspicions involve "criminal activities of a protracted or continuous nature, a
time delay in the sequence of events is of less significance." lg_,_
On appeal, McDonald suggests that Officer Gomez's reasonable suspicion could
only relate to his attempt to falsify his drug test.

(See Appellant's brief, pp.11-12.)

Contrary to McDonald's assumptions, however, Officer Gomez did not merely have
reasonable suspicion that McDonald had attempted to tamper with a drug test; that fact
was only one in a myriad of circumstances, including his failed drug tests, lying to his
probation officer, and failure to enter treatment, that gave Officer Gomez reasonable
suspicion that McDonald was using drugs again. Because Officer Gomez's information
demonstrated that McDonald's narcotics use was protracted, spanning at least four
months, a delay of ten days, which allowed Officer Gomez to conduct her search in
conjunction with her already-scheduled ride-along, was not unreasonable and did not
render Officer Gomez's suspicions "stale."
Consistent both with McDonald's consent in his agreement of supervision and
with Fourth Amendment standards applicable to probation searches, Officer Gomez
searched McDonald's bedroom on reasonable suspicion that he was no longer in
compliance with the terms and conditions of his probation. The district court correctly
denied McDonald's motion to suppress.

McDonald has failed to show error in the
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district court's legal determinations.

The district court's order denying McDonald's

suppression motion should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
denying McDonald's motion to suppress.

DATED this 8th day of February, 2013.

s~
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 8th day of February, 2013, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
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SPENCER J. HAHN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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Deputy Attorney General
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